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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction lies in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(b) (as amended 1988). An order granting permission 
for the interlocutory appeal was entered on April 11, 1990. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Could authority of a homeowner's daughter to consent 
to the police search of a locked crawlspace under the 
home be inferred from the acts of the homeowner 
(Defendant's mother) in giving her daughter a key to the 
living area of the home and asking her to bring her some 
clothes from the home? 
Standard of review: The scope of the 
daughter's authority in the home is a factual issue, and 
inferences from facts should not be disturbed unless the 
inferences are unreasonable or circumscribed by law. 
B. If the police entered without consent, should the 
case be remanded for additional fact finding to determine 
if reliance by the police on the homeowners daughters 
claim of authority was reasonable under all the 
circumstances. 
Standard of Review: This is a legal issue in which 
no factual findings were made. This court should defer 
to the trial courts ability to determine factual issues. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of case, course of proceedings. 
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This is an appeal from an order denying Defen-
dants Motion to suppress evidence of a police search and 
seizure of defendant's home. Defendant filed an interlocutory 
appeal and further prosecution has been stayed in the trial 
court pending this appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The Defendant is a 31 year old male living in a 
separate bedroom in the home of his 58 year old mother. 
(Record, p. 27.) No one else lives in the home. 
Underneath the single story home is a crawlspace used for 
storage. Common items are stored in the crawlspace, but 
the Defendant controlled its access with a keyed lock 
because of his mother's poor health and lack of interest 
or ability to enter the crawlspace. (Record pp. 25, 32) 
On August 29, 1989, the Defendant's mother entered 
the hospital. She was taken to the hospital in her own 
car by her adult daughter, Michelle Lones, who kept the 
car keys. (Record p. 23) The Defendant's mother asked 
Michelle Lones to bring her some clothes from the 
mother's home. (Record pp. 25, 26) A key to the home 
was with the set of car keys. 
At the home, Michelle Lones searched the Defendant's 
separate bedroom where she found various items she 
believed to be "drug paraphernalia" in a desk drawer. 
She did not have keys to the crawlspace, so Mrs. Lones' 
husband "kicked in" the door to the crawlspace, breaking 
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the lock. (Record pp. 7, 19) They entered the space and 
found a large covered box containing a fluorescent light 
and small plants, which they suspected to be marijuana. 
(Record p. 7) 
They left the home and Mrs. Lones called the Clinton 
City Police and told them that the Defendant was using 
drugs in his bedroom and was growing marijuana in the 
crawlspace under the home. She also reported that the 
Defendant had gone camping in Montana and would not 
return for "two or three days." (Record p. 9) 
Clinton Officer Tom Reynolds contacted an officer 
of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force. The two 
officers met Mr. and Mrs. Lones at the home. Together, 
they entered the home where Mrs. Lones showed them the 
"drug paraphernalia" in the desk drawer of the Defen-
dant's bedroom, which the officers seized. (Record p. 6) 
The officers then accompanied Mrs. Lones to the 
entrance of the crawlspace where they noted that the door 
had been forced open. They entered the crawlspace with 
Mrs. Lones where they found a large cardboard box from 
which emanated the glow of a fluorescent light. One end 
of the box was open slightly. When one of the officers 
leaned down and peered into the end of the box on the 
level of the dirt floor, he saw four small potted plants 
which he believed to be marijuana. The officers seized 
the plants. (Record pp 6-7) 
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Neither officer obtained a warrant for the search. 
(Record pp. 9, 12) 
The Defendant was arrested when he returned home 
from his camping trip, and he was charged with possession 
of drug paraphernalia and cultivation of marijuana. 
The Defendant filed a Motion for Suppression of 
Evidence asking for suppression of all evidence obtained 
from the home. (Order, addendum "A") The Honorable 
Rodney S. Page, after hearing the mother, ordered 
suppression of the items of "paraphernalia" seized from 
the Defendant's bedroom, but denied suppression of the 
alleged marijuana plants found growing in the box in the 
crawlspace of the home. 
The Defendant appeals the denial of his Motion to 
Suppress Evidence seized from the crawlspace. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
No evidence was presented at trial which would support 
the court^s conclusion that the homeowner*s adult daughter had 
authority to consent to a police search of the locked crawl-space 
under the home. The daughter did not live in the home. Her 
mother*s instructions to bring some clothes from the home to the 
hospital do not support an inference that the daughter was charged 
with the general care of the home. The Defendant was caring for 
the home. 
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Whatever authority the daughter had did not extend to the 
crawlspace under the home which her husband had to force open 
because the daughter had no key. 
The real issue in the case is whether the officers 
reasonably believed the daughter's claim of authority to consent to 
a search, that issue is best resolved at the trial level. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: IT IS UNREASONABLE TO INFER AUTHORITY TO 
CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF THE CRAWLSPACE UNDER THE HOUSE FROM THE 
HOMEOWNERS REQUEST THAT THE DAUGHTER BRING HER SOME CLOTHES FROM 
THE HOME. 
A fair assessment of inferences from the facts requires 
Appellant to marshall all of those facts upon which the trial court 
might have relied in making its inferences. 
A, MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The homeowner, Gisseila Elder, Defendants mother, 
testified at the hearing concerning the scope of authority she gave 
her adult daughter, Michelle Lones. She was the sole witness with 
personal knowlege of the daughterxs authority. She was the witness 
on whom the court relied in defining the daugh-
ter *s scope of authority in the home. The daughter, Mrs. Lones, 
did not testify. 
The relevant testimony of Gisseila Elder was: 
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1. Mrs. Elder entered the hospital on August 29, 1989 
(record, p. 20). 
2. Mrs. Elder expected to stay in the hospital only a 
few days to rest (record, p. 21). 
3. Defendant, Renee Elder, lived in the home with Mrs. 
Elder (record, p. 20). 
4. Mrs. Elder did not ask her daughter to take police 
to the home (record, pp. 20,26). 
5. Mrs. Elder knew nothing of marijuana growing in the 
crawlspace (record, p. 21). 
6. Mrs. Elder did not give her daughter authority to 
enter the locked crawlspace (record p.22). 
7. The daughter had no general power of attorney or 
other legal authority over her motherxs affairs (record p. 22). 
8. Mrs. Elder gave her daughter no authority to enter 
Defendants bedroom (record p. 22) . 
9. Mrs. Elder allowed her daughter to keep her car keys 
after the daughter had driven Mrs. Elder to the hospital in Mrs. 
Elder*s car (record, p. 23). 
10. When Mrs. Elder entered the hospital, Defendant was 
at work (record, p. 22) . 
11. Defendant went camping over the weekend while Mrs. 
Elder was in the hospital (record, p. 23). 
12. Mrs. Elder had access to the crawlspace under her 
home, but hadnxt been in it for more than a year (record, p. 25). 
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13. While in the hospital, Mrs. Elder asked her daughter 
to return to the home and bring her some clothes. She had only "a 
tee shirt and a pair of....(unintelligible tran-
script) (record, p. 25, 26). 
14. The daughter did bring Mrs. Elder some clothes just 
before Mrs. Elder left the hospital (record, p. 26). 
Police officers who observed and participated in the 
entry into the home testified that: 
15. The daughter, Mrs. Lones, did have a key to the 
living portion of the home (record, p. 6). 
16. The crawlspace door was secured by two deadbolt 
locks (record, p.6). 
17. Mrs. Lones knew the Defendant had locked the 
crawlspace to maintain privacy in it. 
18. Mrs. Lonexs husband had "physically kicked ipen" the 
crawlspace door before the officers arrived (record, pp. 7, 19). 
19. Defendant testified that Mrs. Elder and her daughter 
did not "get along very well" (record, p. 29). 
B. FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
Based on the marshalled evidence, the court entered this 
finding: 
The court finds that the crawlspace of 
the home was a common area used by both 
occupants of the home, and the consent of the 
Defendants mother to search the crawlspace 
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would be valid. although the Defendants 
mother did not consent to a search of the home 
or the crawl space under the home, she gave her 
daughter a key ring with car keys and a key to 
the living areas of the home, and asked her 
daughter to bring her personal items from the 
home. Implied in these facts was the 
authority to care for the home and its 
contents during Mrs. Elder*s stay in the 
hospital. With such authority, Mrs. Lones 
consented to the entry of the police officers 
into the crawlspace. 
Order and Findings on Defen-
dants Motion for Suppression 
of Evidence p. 2 (addendum No. 
1). 
C. ARGUMENT 
The courtxs inference of a general authority in Mrs. 
Lones to "care for the home and contents" is unsupported by the 
evidence. The inferrence is also not a reasonable conclusion and 
cannot reasonably be extended to the crawlspace. 
Mrs. Elder and the Defendant lived together and cared for 
the home together. When Mrs. Elder entered the hospital, the 
Defendant was left to care for the home. There is no evidence that 
Mrs. Elder was concerned about the care of her home or that she 
knew the Defendant would go camping the next weekend. 
Mrs. Elder*s request for Mrs. Lones to bring her some 
clothes carried no instructions for the care of the home. As Mrs. 
Elder testified "I only asked her to bring me some clothes" 
(record, p. 26). 
Neither is there any evidence that Mrs. Lones actually 
cared for the home, other than to bring the police to conduct the 
search. Even more unreasonable is the inferrence that Mrs. Lones* 
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authority over the home included authority to enter the locked 
crawlspace. Mrs. Elder did not give her the separate key to the 
crawlspace or give her any instructions relative to the crawlspace. 
Mrs. Lones did not discover the key to the crawlspace in the living 
area of the home. To the contrary, she had no key and gained entry 
by having her husband kick the door in (record, pp. 7, 9). How 
this action could be a logical extensiton of Mrs. Elder*s request 
for some clothes is unexplained. No evidence exists that Mrs. 
Lones needed access to the crawlspace under the home in caring for 
it during the few days Mrs. Elder was in the hospital. Surely, 
Mrs. Lones needed no access to the crawlspace to find a few items 
of Mrs. Elder*s clothing. Mrs. Elder hadn*t been in the crawlspace 
for over a year (record, p. 25). 
POINT TWO: A THIRD PARTY^S AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO A 
HOME SEARCH SHOULD BE STRICTLY INTERPRETED. 
Unless a search falls within one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, it "is unlawful unless 
authority actually exists" Illinois v. Edward Rodriguez, U.S. 
(1990), 58 U.S.L.W. 4892 (No. 88-2018, decided June 21, 1990) 
(copy attached as addendum "B") . See also: In Interest of I., 
R.L. , 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989) [waiver only with "actual consent", 
quoting (at footnote 3) 68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, Section 
46, "consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but should 
be shown by clear and convincing evidence".] This "actual consent" 
requirement mandates inquiry into the true intent of the homeowner. 
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If that intent was to allow the third-party limited access rather 
than general control over the home, it will not support a consent 
search of the home. 
In Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), the U.S. 
Supreme Court invalidated a search of a hotel room even though made 
with the consent of the desk clerk. Certainly, the clerk had the 
right ot enter the room for hotel purposes, but the search was 
invalid. 
It is true that the night clerk clearly 
and unambiguously consented to the search. 
But, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the police had any basis 
whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had 
been authorized by the petitioner to permit 
the police to search the petitionees room. 
Id at p. 489. 
The consent of a landlord or hotel or motel manager is 
insufficient to justify a warrantless search. See: State vs. Kent, 
432 P.2d 64, 20 Utah 2d 1 (Utah 1967). 
The right of Mrs. Lones to enter the home for the purpose 
of getting Mrs. Elder some clothes for the hospital should be 
strictly construed with clear and convincing evidence. It should 
not be broadly construed to allow her to kick in the door of the 
crawl space under the home and to invite the police to see the 
evidence. 
POINT THREE: THE REAL ISSUE IN THE CASE IS WHETHER THE 
POLICE OFFICERS REASONABLY BELIEVED THE HOMEWONER*S DAUGHTER TO 
HAVE AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO THE SEARCH. 
10 
The officers in this case clearly believed Mrs. Lones to 
have authority to consent to the search of the home (e.g. record, 
pp. 12, 13). This may support a new exception to the warrant 
requirements under the June 1990 case of Illinois vs. Edward 
Rodriguez, supra at 4892. Whether the police believed Mrs. Lonesx 
claim is a factual issue. This new rule was announced after the 
ruling and appeal in this case. 
POINT FOUR: THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A FACTUAL 
HEARING ON THE REASONABLENESS OF THE OFFICER* BELIEF IN MRS. LONES* 
CONSENT. 
Because the Rodriguez case, supra, was decided after this 
appeal was taken, neither party has had an opportunity to address 
this issue in an evidentiary hearing. The officers will attempt to 
support the reasonableness of their belief in Mrs. Lones* 
authority. The Defendant will present evidence that no urgency 
existed (record, p. 17) , that Mrs. Elder was available but never 
called (record, p. 17) , that Mrs. Lones * lack of a key to the 
crawlspace should have aroused the officers* suspicions, and that 
other factors should be weighed in the decision. A remand to the 
trial court is the best resolution of this issue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the trial courtxs finding of 
actual consent for the search of the crawlspace under the home, and 
remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the 
officersx belief in the daughters authority to consent was 
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reasonable under the new doctrine of Illinois vs. Edward Rodriguez, 
supra, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court since the taking of this 
appeal. ^ 
Respectfully submitted this J - day of 
At^prney ffj6r Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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JACK C. HELGESEN, #1451 
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL, & JONES, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
America First Building 
4768 Harrison Blvd. 
Oqden, Utah 84403 
Telephone (801) 470-4777 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * ORDER AND FINDINGS ON 
* DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, * SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 
v. * 
* 
RENEE ELDER, * 
Defendant. * Case No. 891706570 FS 
The Defendant's Motion for Suppression of Evidence 
was heard on December 26, 1989 at 1:30 p.m. The Defendant 
was present and was represented by Jack C. Helqesen. the 
state was represented by William McGuire, Deputy Davis 
County Attorney. The court heard testimony and considered 
the arquments of the parties, and now enters its Order and 
Findings. 
The court finds that Defendant maintained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom and that 
the search of the Defendant's bedroom was conducted 
without a search warrant, without the Defendant's consent 
and in the absence of any other fact justifyinq a warrant-
less search. 
THEREFORE/ the court orders suppression of all 
evidence seized in the Defendant's bedroom. 
_ EXHIBIT "A" _ 
The court considered also the Defendant's argu-
ments that 1) the Defendant maintained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the crawlspace under the home 
shared by the Defendant; 2) the Defendant maintained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the larqe box 
containinq plants alleqed to be marijuana? 3) the consent 
of Michelle Lones to the search of the crawlspace was not 
valid. 
The court finds that the crawlspace of the home 
was a common area used by both occupants of the home# and 
the consent of the Defendant's mother to search the 
crawlspace would be valid. Althouah the Defendant's 
mother did not consent to a search of the home or the 
crawlspace under the home, she qave her dauqhter a key 
rinq with car keys and a key to the livinq areas of the 
home, and asked her dauqhter to brinq her personal items 
from the home. Implied in these facts was the authority 
to care for the home and its contents durinq Mrs. Elder's 
stay in the hospital. With such authority, Mrs. Lones 
consented to the entry of the police officers into the 
crawlspace. Having entered the crawlspace, the officers 
saw the arowina plants in plain view throuqh the open end 
of the box. 
THEREFORE, the entry of the police into the 
crawlspace of the home was lawful and the plants qrowinq 
in the box were within the plain view of the officers. 
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The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Evidence found in 
the crawlspace of the home is denied. 
The court specifically considered the Defendant's 
argument that officers could not seize the qrowing plants 
without a warrant even though they were in plain view 
through the end of the box. The court finds that the 
growing plants were intended objects of the search and 
their seizure by the officers was lawful. 
Dated this /2,*k day of January, 1990. 
By the Court: 
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control of the Club's accountants I find this interpretation 
of the words 'trade or business" simply "to affront common 
understanding and to deny the facts of common experience " 
Helvering v Horst, 311 U S 112, 118 (1940) A taxpayer 
does not alter the nature of an enterprise by selecting one 
reasonable allocation method over another 
The Court's decision also departs from the traditional prac-
tice of the courts and the IRS Rather than relying on strict 
consistency in accounting, the courts long have evaluated 
profit motivation according to a variety of factors that indi-
cate whether the taxpayer acted in a manner characteristic of 
one engaged in a trade or business See, e g , Teitelbaum 
v C I R , 294 F 2d 541, 545 (CA7 1961), Patterson v 
United States, 459 F 2d 487, 493-494 (Ct CI 1972), see 
Boyle, What is a Trade or Business9, 39 Tax Law 737, 
743-745 (1986), Lee, A Blend of Old Wmes m a New Wine-
skin Section 183 and Beyond, 29 Tax L Review 347, 390-447 
(1974) In a regulation based on a wide range of prior court 
decisions, the IRS itself has explained § 162 and profit moti-
vation as follows 
"Deductions are allowable under section 162 for ex-
penses of carrying on activities which constitute a trade 
or busmess of the taxpayer and under section 212 for ex-
penses incurred in connection with activities engaged in 
for the production or collection of mcome or for the man-
agement, conservation, or maintenance of property held 
for the production of mcome Except as provided in 
section 183 and [26 CFR] § 1 183-1 [which authorize indi-
viduals and S-corporations to offset hobby losses], no 
deductions are allowable for expenses incurred m con-
nection with activities which are not engaged m for 
profit The determination whether an activity is 
engaged m for profit is to be made by reference to objec-
tive standards, taking into account all of the facts and 
circumstances of each case Although a reasonable 
expectation of profit is not required, the facts and cir-
cumstances must indicate that the taxpayer entered into 
the activity, or continued the activity, with the oojective 
of making a profit " 26 CFR § 1 183-2(a) (1989) 
To facilitate the application of this general standard, the IRS 
has supplied a list of nine factors, also based on a wiae body 
of case law, for evaluating the taxpayer's profit motive 
These factors include (1) the manner in which the taxpayer 
carries on the activity, (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his 
advisors, (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in 
carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation that assets used 
in the activity may appreciate m value, (5) the success of the 
taxpayer m carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities, 
(6) the taxpaj er's history of income or losses with respect to 
the activity, (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which 
are earned, (8) the financial status of the taxpayer, and (9) 
the elements of personal pleasure or recreation See id , at 
§ 1 183-2(b)(lM9) 
The Court today limits this longstanding approach by pin-
ning the profit-motive requirement to the accounting method 
that a taxpayer uses to report its ordinary and necessary ex-
penses under § 162(a) Although the tax laws in general 
strive to reflect the true economic income of a taxpayer, the 
IRS at times allows taxpayers to use accounting methods 
that understate their mcome or overstate then* expenses In 
this case, as the Court itself acknowledges, the IRS stipu-
lated that the Club could use the gross-to-gross allocation 
method to calculate its expenses under § 162(a) even though 
this method tends to exaggerate the percentage of fixed costs 
attributable to the Club's nonmember sales See ante, at 3, 
n 4 Yet, I see no basis for saying that, when the Club 
took advantage of this unconditional stipulation, it committed 
itself to the legal position that the gross-to-gross method best 
reflects economic reality Some mconsistency will exist if 
the Club uses the gross-to-gross allocation method in comput-
ing the expenses, while usmg some other reasonable account-
ing method to prove that it undertook the nonmember activ-
ity as a trade or business But the solution to this 
mconsistency lies m altering the stipulation in other cases, 
not m changing the longstanding interpretation of profit 
motivation 
The precise effect of the Court's holding with respect to the 
Club remams unclear The Court states only that the Club 
may not offset its losses from nonmember sales against its in-
vestment income But I do not understand how the Court 
can confine its ruling to investment income alone If the 
Club's nonmemlSer activity does not qualify as a trade or 
business, then the Club cannot use § 162(a) to deduct any of 
the expenses associated with the nonmember activity, not 
even to the extent of gross receipts Confronted with this 
difficultly at oral argument, respondent stated that, in the 
absence of statutory authority, the IRS has allowed an offset 
of expenses against gross receipts out of its own "generos-
ity," a characteristic as rare as it is implausible Tr of Oral 
Arg 42-43 The IRS, indeed, asserts the authority to disal-
low the offset in the future See id , at 44 Cf 26 U S C 
§183 (authorizing individuals and S-corporations to offset 
hobby losses) This possibility further counsels against mak-
ing the profit-motive requirement more stringent than neces-
sary to determine whether the Club undertook the nonmem-
ber activity as a trade or busmess For these reasons, I join 
the Court's opinion, with the exception of Parts III-B and 
IV, and concur m the judgment 
LEONARD J HENZKE JR Washington DC (LEHRFELD 
CANTER & HENZKE PC ALLEN B BLSH and MCEWEN 
GISVOLD RANKIN & STEWART on the bnets) tor petitioner 
CLIFFORD Vf SLOAN Assistant to the Solicitor General (KEN 
NETH W STARR Sol Gen SHIRLE\ D PETERSON Asst 
\ t t \ Gen ROBERT S POMERXNCE ana KENNETH L 
GREENE Justice Dent ams on the briers) lor respondent 
No 88-2018 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v EDWARD RODRIGUEZ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF 
ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT 
Syllabus 
No 88-2018 Argued March 20 1990-Decided June 21, 1990 
Respondent was arrested in his apartment and charged with possession 
of illegal drugs, which the police had observed in plain view and seized 
The officers did not have an arrest or search warrant, but gained entry 
to the apartment with the assistance of Gail Fischer, who represented 
that the apartment was 'ourfs]" and that she had clothes and furni-
ture there, unlocked the door with her key, and gave the officers permis-
sion to enter The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress 
the seized evidence holding that at the time she consented to the entry 
Fischer did not have common authonty because she had moved out of the 
apartment The court also rejected the State's contention that, even 
if Fischer did not have common authority there was no Fourth Amend-
ment violation if the police reasonably believed at the time of their entry 
that she possessed the authority to consent The Appellate Court of 
Illinois affirmed 
Held 
1 The record demonstrates that the State has not satisfied its bur-
den of proving that Fischer had "joint access or control for most pur-
poses" over respondent's apartment, as is required under United States 
v Matlock 415 U S 164, 171, n. 7, to establish 'common authonty 
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2 A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third 
party whom the police at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to 
possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not 
(a) Because the Appellate Court's opinion does not contain a "plain 
statement" that its decision rests on an adequate and independent state 
ground, it is subject to review by this Court See Michigan v Long 
463 U S 1032 1040-1042 
(b) What respondent is assured by the Fourth Amendment is not 
that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents 
but that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable " As with the 
many other factual determinations that must regularly be made by gov-
ernment agents in the Fourth Amendment context the ^reasonableness' 
of a police determination of consent to enter must be judged not by 
whether the police were correct in their assessment but by the objective 
standard of whether the facts available at the moment would warrant a 
person of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had 
authority over the premises If not, then warrantless entry without 
further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists But if so 
the search is valid Stoner v California 376 U S 483 reconciled 
(c) On remand the appellate court must determine whether the po-
lice reasonaoiy believed that Fischer had authority to consent to the 
entry into respondent's apartment 
177 I1L App 3d 1154 550 N E 2d 65 reversed and remanded 
SCALIA J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST 
C J and WHITE, BLACKMUN O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY JJ joined 
MARSHALL, J , filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STE-
VENS JJ , joined 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court 
In United States v Matlock, 415 U S 164 (1974), this 
Court reaffirmed that a warrantless entry and search by law 
enforcement officers does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment's proscription of "unreasonaole searches and seizures" 
if the officers have obtained the consent of a third party who 
possesses common authority over the premises The pres-
ent case presents an issue we expressly reserved in Matlock, 
see id , at 177, n 14 whether a warrantless entry is valid 
when based upon the consent of a third party whom the po-
lice, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess 
common authority over the premises, but who in fact does 
not do so 
I 
Respondent Edward Rodriguez was arrested in his apart-
ment by law enforcement officers and charged with posses-
sion of illegal drugs The police gamed entry to the apart-
ment with the consent and assistance of Gail Fischer, who 
had lived there with respondent for several months The 
relevant facts leading to the arrest are as follows 
On July 26,1985, police were summoned to the residence of 
Dorothy Jackson on South Wolcott in Chicago They were 
met by Ms Jackson's daughter, Gail Fischer, who showed 
signs of a severe beating She told the officers that she 
had been assaulted by respondent Edward Rodriguez earlier 
that day in an apartment on South California Fischer 
stated that Rodriguez was then asleep in the apartment, and 
she consented to travel there with the police in order to un-
lock the door with her key so that the officers could enter and 
arrest him During this conversation, Fischer several times 
referred to the apartment on South California as "our" apart-
ment, and said that she had clothes and furniture there It 
is unclear whether she indicated that she currently lived at 
the apartment, or only that she used to live there 
The police officers drove to the apartment on South Cali-
fornia, accompanied by Fischer They did not obtain an ar-
rest warrant for Rodriguez, nor did they seek a search war-
rant for the apartment At the apartment, Fischer unlocked 
the door with her key and gave the officers permission to 
enter They moved through the door into the living room, 
where they observed in plain view drug paraphernalia and 
containers filled with white powder that they believed cor-
rectly, as later analysis showed) to be cocaine The} pro-
ceeded to the bedroom, where they found Rodriguez asleep 
and discovered additional containers of white powder in two 
open attache* cases The officers arrested Rodriguez and 
seized the drugs and related paraphernalia 
Rodriguez was charged with possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to deliver He moved to suppress all evi-
dence seized at the time of his arrest, claiming that Fischer 
had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and had no 
authority to consent to the entry The Cook Count} Circuit 
Court granted the motion, holding that at the time she con-
sented to the entry Fischer did not have common authority 
over the apartment The Court concluded that Fischer was 
not a "usual resident" but rather an "infrequent visitor' at 
the apartment on South California, based upon its finairgs 
that Fischer's name was not on the lease ^hat she did not 
contribute to the rent, that she was not allowed to invite oth-
ers to the apartment on her own, that she did not have access 
to the apartment when respondent was aw a>, and that -ne 
had moved some of her possessions from 'he apartment 
The Circuit Court also rejected the State s contention that, 
even if Fischer did not possess common authority over die 
premises, there was no Fourth Amendment violation if 'he 
police reasonably believed at the time of their entry that Fi-
scher possessed the authority to consent 
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the Circuit Court 
m all respects The Illinois Supreme Court denied the 
State's Petition for Leave to Appeal, 125 111 2d 572 537 
N E 2d 816 (1989), and we granted certiorari 493 U 3 
(1989) 
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrant-
less entry of a person's home, whether to make an arrest 
or to search for specific objects Payton v New York 445 
U S 573 (1980), Johnson v United States 333 U S 10 
(1948) The prohibition does not appl\, however to situa-
tions in which voluntary consent has been ootained, either 
from the individual whose property is searched, see ScnnecK-
loth v Bustamonte, 412 U S 218 (1973), or from a third 
party who possesses common authority over the premises, 
see United States v Matlock, supra, at 171 The State of 
Illinois contends that that exception applies m the present 
case 
As we stated in Matlock, 415 U S , at 171 n 7 *[c ora-
mon authority" rests "on mutual use of the property D\ 
persons generally having joint access or control for most 
purposes " The burden of establishing that common 
authority rests upon the State On the basis of this rec-
ord, it is clear that burden was not sustained The evidence 
showed that although Fischer, with her two small children, 
had lived with Rodriguez beginning in December 1984, she 
had moved out on July 1, 1985, almost a month before rhe 
search at issue here, and had gone to live with her mother-
She took her and her children's clothing with her, though 
leaving behind some furniture and household effects Dur-
ing the period after July 1 she sometimes spent the night at 
Rodriguez's apartment, but never invited her friends there, 
and never went there herself when he was not home Her 
name was not on the lease nor did she contribute to the rent 
She had a key to the apartment, which she said at trial she 
had taken without Rodriguez's knowledge (though she testi-
fied at the prehmmary hearmg that Rodriguez had given her 
the key) On these facts the State has not established that. 
with respect to the South California apartment, Fischer had 
"joint access or control for most purposes " To the contrary, 
the Appellate Court's determination of no common authority 
over the apartment was obviouslv correct 
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III 
A 
The State contends that, e\en if Fischer did not in fact 
have authority to give consent it suffices to validate the 
entry that the law enforcement officers reasonably believed 
she did Before reaching the merits of that contention, we 
must consider a jurisdictional oojection that the decision 
below rests on an adequate and mdependent state ground 
Respondent asserts that the Illinois Constitution provides 
greater protection than is afforded under the Fourth Amend-
ment and tha* tne Appellate Cour relied upon this when it 
determined thar a reasonable belief by the police officers w as 
insufficient 
When a state court decision is clearly based on state law 
that is both adequate and mdependent, we will not reuew 
tne decision Michiqan\ Long 463 U S 1032 1041(1983) 
But w hen ' a state court decision fairly appears to rest pri-
marily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law," 
we require that it contain a " 'plain statement' that [it] rests 
upon adequate and independent state grounds," id at 1040, 
1042, otherwise "we will accept as the most reasonable ex-
planation that the state court decided the case the w ay it did 
because it believed that federal law required it to do so " 
Id at 1041 Here, the Appellate Court's opinion contains 
no 'plain statement" that its decision rests on state law 
The opinior does not rely on (or even mention) any specific 
provision of the Illinois Constitution, nor even the Illinois 
Constitution generally Even the Illinois cases cited by the 
opinion rely upon no constitutional provisions other than the 
Fourth ana Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution We conclude tnat the Appellate Court of Illi-
nois rested it* decision on federal law 
B 
On the merits of the issue, respondent asserts that permit-
ting a reasonable Delief of common authority to validate an 
entry w ould cause a defendant s Fourth Amendment rights 
to be ' vicariously waived " Brief for Respondent 32 We 
disagree 
"ft e have been unyielding m our insistence that a defend-
ant's waiver of his trial rights cannot be given effect unless 
it is "knowing and "intelligent " Colorado v Spring, 479 
U S 564 574-575 (1987), Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U S 458 
(1938) We would assuredly not permit, therefore, evidence 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be mtroduced 
on the basis of a trial court's mere "reasonable belief "—de-
rived from statements by unauthorized persons—that the 
defendant has waived his objection But one must make a 
distinction oetween on the one hand trial rights that derive 
from the \iolation of constitutional guarantees and, on the 
other hand the nature of those constitutional guarantees 
themselves As we said m Schneckloth 
"There is a vast difference between those rights that 
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed 
under the Fourth Amendment Nothing, either in the 
purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' 
waiver of trial rights, or m the practical application 
of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be ex-
tended to the constitutional guarantee against unreason-
able searches and seizures " 412 U S , at 241 
What Rodriguez is assured by the trial right of the ex-
clusionary rule, where it applies, is that no evidence seized 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be mtroduced 
at his trial unless he consents What he is assured by the 
Fourth Amendment itself, however, is not that no govern-
ment search of his house will occur unless he consents, but 
that no sucn search will occur that is "unreasonable " U S 
Const, Amdt 4 There are various elements, of course, 
that can make a search of a person s house ' reasonable"—one 
of w hich is the consent of the person or his cotenant The 
essence of respondent's argument is that we should impose 
upon this element a requirement that we have not imposed 
upon other elements that regularly compel government offi-
cers to exercise judgment regarding the facts namely, the 
requirement that their judgment be not only responsible but 
correct 
The fundamental objective that alone validates all un-
consented government searches is, of course, the seizure of 
persons who have committed or are about to commit crimes, 
or of evidence related to crimes But "reasonableness," with 
respect to this necessary element, does not demand that the 
government be factually correct m its assessment that that is 
what a search will produce Warrants need only be sup-
ported by "probable cause," wnich demands no more than 
a proper "assessment of prooabilities in particular factual 
contexts " Illinois v Gates, 462 U S 213 232 (1983) 
If a magistrate, cased upon seemingly reliable but factually 
maccurate information, issues a warrant for the search of 
a house m which the sought-after felon is not present, has 
never been present and was never likely to nave been pres-
ent the owner of that house suffers one of the inconveniences 
we all expose ourselves to as the cost of living in a safe soci-
ety, he does not suffer a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
Another element often, though not m\ ariaoly required m 
order to render an unconsented search "reasonable" is, of 
course, that the officer be authorized oy a valid warrant 
Here also we have not held that "reasonableness' precludes 
error with respect to those factual judgments that law en-
forcement officials are expected to make In Maryland \ 
Garrison, 480 U S 79 (1987), a warrant supported by proba-
ble cause with respect to one apartment wTas erroneously is-
sued for an entire floor that was divided (though not clearly) 
mto two apartments We upheld the search of the apart-
ment not properly covered by the warrant We said 
"[T]he validity of the search of respondent's apartment 
pursuant to a warrant authorizing the searcn of the en-
tire third floor depends on whether the officers' failure to 
realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively 
understandable and reasonable Here it unquestionably 
was The objective facts available to the officers at the 
time suggested no distinction between [the suspect's] 
apartment and the third-floor premises " Id at 88 
The ordinary requirement of a warrant is sometimes sup-
planted by other elements that render the unconsented 
search "reasonable " Here also we have not held that the 
Fourth Amendment requires factual accuracy A warrant is 
not needed, for example, where the search is mcident to an 
arrest In Hill v California, 401 U S 797 (1971), we up-
held a search mcident to an arrest, even though the arrest 
was made of the wrong person We said 
"The upshot was that the officers in good faith be-
lieved Miller was Hill and arrested him They were 
quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith 
belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the 
subsequent search But sufficient probability, not cer-
tainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the offi-
cers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a rea-
sonable response to the situation facing them at the 
time " Id , at 803-804 
It would be superfluous to multiply these examples It is 
apparent that m order to satisfy the "reasonableness" re-
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quirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally de-
manded of the many factual determinations that must regu-
larly be made by agents of the government—whether the 
magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a 
warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure 
under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement—is 
not that they always be correct, but that they always be rea-
sonable As we put it m Bnnegar v United States, 338 
U S 160, 176 (1949) 
"Because many situations which confront officers in the 
course of executing their duties are more or less ambigu-
ous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their 
part But the mistakes must be those of reasonable 
men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions 
of probability " 
We see no reason to depart from this general rule with re-
spect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent to a 
search Whether the basis for such authority exists is the 
sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement 
officials must be expected to apply their judgment, and all 
the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it rea-
sonably The Constitution is no more violated when officers 
enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though 
erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to 
their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated 
when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably 
(though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent 
felon who is about to escape See Archibald v Mosel, 677 F 
2d 5 (CA1 1982) * 
Stoner v California, 376 U S 483 (1964) is in our view not 
to the contrary There, in holding that police had improp-
erly entered the defendant's hotel room based on the consent 
of a hotel clerk, we stated that "the rights protected oy the 
Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by unrealistic 
doctrines of 'apparent authority '" Id , at 488 It is ambig-
uous, of course, whether the word "unrealistic" is descriptive 
or limiting—that is, whether we were condemning as unre-
alistic all reliance upon apparent authority, or whether we 
were condemnmg only such reliance upon apparent authority 
as is unrealistic Similarly ambiguous is the opinion's earlier 
statement that "there [is no] substance to the claim that the 
search was reasonable because the police, relying UDon the 
night clerk's expressions of consent, had a reasonaole basis 
for the belief that the clerk had authority to consent to the 
search " Ibid Was there no substance to it because it 
failed as a matter of law, or because the facts could not 
possibly support it0 At one point the opinion does seem to 
speak clearly 
"It is important to bear m mind that it was the peti-
tioner's constitutional right which was at stake here, and 
* JUSTICE MARSHALL S dissent rests upon a rejection of the proposition 
that searcnes pursuant to valid third-partv consent are generally reason-
able ' Post at " Oniv a warrant or exigent circumstances he contends 
can produce 'reasonableness' consent validates *he search oniv because 
the object of the search thereby 1iimt[sj his expectation of privac post 
at 10, so that the search becomes not really a search at alL We see no 
basis for making such an artificial distinction. To describe a consented 
search as a non-invasion of privacy and thus a non-search is strange in the 
extreme And while it must be admitted that this ingenious device can 
explain why consented searches are lawful, it cannot explain whv seem-
ingly consented searches are "unreasonable," which is all that the Consti-
tution forbids See Delaunre v Prouse 440 U S 648, 653-654 (1979) 
("[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is 
to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by 
government officials') The only basis for contending that the constitu-
tional standard could not possibly have been met here is the argument thar 
reasonableness must be judged by the facts as they were rather than by 
the facts as they were known As we have discussed in text that argu-
ment has long since been rejected 
not the night clerk's nor the hotel's It was a right, 
therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word 
or deed, either directly or through an agent " Id , at 
489 
But as we have discussed, what is at issue when a claim of 
apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free 
of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free 
of unrea$07iable searches has been violated Even if one 
does not think the Sterner opinion had this subtlet\ m mind, 
the supposed clarity of its foregoing statement is immediately 
compromised, as follows 
"It is true that the night clerk clearly and unambiguous^ 
consented to the search But there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the police had any basis whatso-
ever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized 
by the petitioner to permit the police to search the peti-
tioner's room " Ibid (emphasis added) 
The italicized language should have oeen deleted, of course 
if the statement two sentences earlier meant that an appear-
ance of authority could never validate a search In the last 
analysis, one must admit that the rationale of Stoner was 
ambiguous—and perhaps deliberately so It is at least a rea-
sonable reading of the case, and perhaps a preferable one, 
that the police could not rely upon the obtained consent be-
cause they knew it came from a hotel clerk, knew that the 
room was rented and exclusively occupied by the defendant 
and could not reasonably have believed that the former had 
general access to or control over the latter Similarly am-
biguous in its implications (the Court's opinion does not ev en 
allude to, much less discuss the effects of, "reasonable be-
lief") is Chapman v United States, 365 U S 610 (1961) In 
sum, we were correct m Matlock, 415 U S , at 177 n 14 
when we regarded the present issue as unresolved 
As Stoner demonstrates, what we hold today does not sug-
gest that law enforcement officers may always accept a per-
son's invitation to enter premises Even when the invitation 
is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives 
there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be 
such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not 
act upon it without further inquiry As with other factual 
determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determina-
tion of consent to enter must "be judged agamst an objective 
standard would the facts availaDle to the officer at the mo-
ment 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief " 
that the consenting party had authority over the premises9 
Terry v Ohio, 392 U S 1, 21-22 (1968) If not, then war-
rantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless au-
thority actually exists But if so, the search is valid 
# * * 
In the present case, the Appellate Court found it unnec-
essary to determine whether the officers reasonably believed 
that Fischer had the authority to consent because it ruled as 
a matter of law that a reasonaole belief could not validate the 
entry Smce we find that ruling to be m error, we remand 
for consideration of that question The judgment of the Illi-
nois Appellate Court is reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion 
So ordered 
JUSTICE MAPSHALL, with whom JLSTICE BRE^WN and 
JUSTICE STE\ENS join, dissenting 
Dorothy Jackson summoned police officers to her house to 
report that her daughter Gail Fischer had oeen b^afcen Fi-
scher told police that Ed Rodriguez her boyfriend, was he> 
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assaulter. During an interview with Fischer, one of the offi-
cers asked if Rodriguez dealt in narcotics. Fischer did not 
respond. Fischer did agree, however, to the officers' re-
quest to let them into Rodriguez's apartment so that they 
couid arrest him for battery. The police, without a warrant 
and despite the absence of an exigency, entered Rodriguez's 
home to arrest him. As a result of their entry, the police 
discovered narcotics that the State subsequently sought to 
introduce in a drug prosecution against Rodriguez. 
The majority agrees with the Illinois appellate court's 
determination that Fischer did not have authority to consent 
to the officers' entry of Rodriguez's apartment. Ante, at 4. 
The Court holds that the warrantless entry into Rodriguez's 
home was nonetheless valid if the officers reasonably be-
lieved that Fischer had authority to consent. Ante, at 11. 
The majority's defense of this position rests on a misconcep-
tion of the basis for third-party consent searches. That such 
searches do not give rise to claims of constitutional violations 
rests not on the premise that they are ''reasonable" under the 
Fourth Amendment, see ante, at 6, but on the premise that a 
person may voluntarily limit his expectation of privacy by al-
lowing others to exercise authority over his possessions. Cf. 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S* 347, 351* (1967) ("What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"). 
Thus, an individual's decision to permit another "joint access 
[to] or control [over the property] for most purposes," 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164, 171, n. 7 (1974). lim-
its that individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and to 
that extent limits his Fourth Amendment protections. Cf. 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 14S (1978) (because passen-
ger in car lacked "legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
glove compartment." Court did not decide whether search 
would violate Fourth Amendment rights of someone who had 
such expectation). If an individual has not so limited his 
expectation of privacy, the police may not dispense with the 
safeguards established by the Fourth Amendment. 
The baseline for the reasonableness of a search or seizure 
in the home is the presence of a warrant. Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives Assn., 489 U. S. (1989). In-
deed, "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant 
are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 586 (1980). Exceptions to the warrant require-
ment must therefore serve "compelling" law enforcement 
goais. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385. 394 (1978). Be-
cause the sole law enforcement purpose underlying third-
party consent searches is avoiding the inconvenience of se-
curing a warrant, a departure from the warrant requirement 
is not justified simpiy because an officer reasonably believes 
a third party has consented to a search of the defendant's 
home. In holding otherwise, the majority ignores our long-
standing view that "the informed and deliberate determina-
tions of magistrates . . . as to what searches and seizures are 
permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over 
the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to 
make arrests." United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 
464 (1932). 
I 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be vio-
ated." We have recognized that the "physical entry of the 
icme is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
rourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United 
fates District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). We have 
irther held that "a search or seizure carried out on a sus-
ect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, un-
less the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully 
defined set of exceptions." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U. S. 443, 474 (1971). Those exceptions must be crafted in 
light of the warrant requirement's purposes. As this Court 
stated in McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948): 
"The presence of a search warrant serves a high func-
tion. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth 
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the 
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield crimi-
nals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activi-
ties. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh 
the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the 
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to 
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detec-
tion of crime and the arrest of criminals." Id., at 
455-456. 
The Court has tolerated departures from the warrant 
requirement only when an exigency makes a warrantless 
search imperative to the safety of the police and of the com-
munity. See. e. g., id., at 456, ('We cannot be true to that 
constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a 
search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemp-
tion from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of 
the situation made that course imperative"); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Chime! v. California, 
395 U. S. 752 (1969) (interest in officers' safety justifies 
search incident to an arrest); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 
499, 509 (1978) ("compelling need for official action and no 
time to secure a warrant" justifies warrantless entry of burn-
ing building). The Court has often heard, and steadfastly 
rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the 
warrant requirement for searches of the home because of the 
burdens on police investigation and prosecution of crime. 
Our rejection of such claims is not due to a lack of apprecia-
tion of the difficulty and importance of effective law enforce-
ment, but rather to our firm commitment to "the view of 
those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a per-
son's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the 
name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal 
law." Mincey, supra, at 393 (citing United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U. S. 1. 6-11 (1977)). 
In the absence of an exigency, then, warrantless home 
searches and seizures are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. The weighty constitutional interest in pre-
venting unauthorized intrusions into the home overrides any 
law enforcement interest in relying on the reasonable but po-
tentially mistaken belief that a third party has authority to 
consent to such a search or seizure. Indeed, as the present 
case illustrates, only the minimal interest in avoiding the in-
convenience of obtaining a warrant weighs in on the law en-
forcement side. 
Against this law enforcement interest in expediting arrests 
is "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silver-
man v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). To be sure, 
in some cases in which police officers reasonably rely on a 
third party's consent, the consent will prove valid, no intru-
sion will result, and the police will have been spared the in-
convenience of securing a warrant. But in other cases, such 
as this one, the authority claimed by the third party will be 
false. The reasonableness of police conduct must be meas-
ured in light of the possibility that the target has not con-
sented. Where "[n]o reason is offered for not obtaining a 
search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and 
some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present 
the evidence to a magistrate," the Constitution demands that 
the warrant procedure be observed. Johnson v. United 
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States, 333 U S 10, 15 (1948) The concerns of expediting 
police work and avoiding paperwork "are never very convinc-
ing reasons and, m these circumstances, certainly are not 
enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement " Ibid 
In this case, as m Johnson, "[n]o suspect was fleeing or likely 
to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of 
a movable vehicle No evidence or contraband was threat-
ened with removal or destruction If the officers in this 
case were excused from their constitutional duty of present-
ing their evidence to a magistrate, it is difficult to think of a 
case m which it should be required " Ibid 
Unlike searches conducted pursuant to the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, see supra^ at 
, third-party consent searches are not based on an 
exigency and therefore serve no compelling social goal Po-
lice officers, when faced with the cnoice of relying on consent 
by a third party or securmg a warrant, should secure a war-
rant, and must therefore accept the risk of error should they 
instead choose to rely on consent. 
II 
Our prior cases discussing searches based on third-party 
consent have never suggested that such searches are "rea-
sonable " In United States v Matlock, this Court upheld a 
warrantless search conducted pursuant to the consent of a 
third party who was living with the defendant The Court 
rejected the defendant's challenge to the search, stating that 
a person who permits others to have "joint access or control 
for most purposes assume[s] the risk that [such persons] 
mignt permit the common area to oe searched " 415 U S , 
at 171. n 7, see also Frazier v Cupp, 394 U S 731. 740 
(1969) (holding that defendant who left a duffel bag at anoth-
er's house and allowed joint use of the bag "assumed the risk 
that [the person] would allow someone else to look inside') 
As the Court's assumption-of-nsk analysis makes clear, 
third-party consent limits a person s ability to challenge the 
reasonaoleness of the search only because that person volun-
tarily has relinquished some of his expectation of privacy by 
sharing access or control over his property with another 
person. 
A search conducted pursuant to an officer s reasonaole but 
mistaken belief that a third party had authority to consent is 
thus on an entirely different constitutional footing from one 
oased on the consent of a third party who in fact has such au-
thority Even if the officers reasonably believed that Fi-
scher had authority to consent, she did not, and Rodriguez's 
expectation of privacy was therefore undiminished Rodri-
guez accordingly can challenge the warrantless intrusion into 
his home as a violation of the Fourth Amendment This con-
clusion flows directly from Stoner v California, 376 U. S 
483 (1964) There, the Court required the suppression of ev-
idence seized m reliance on a hotel clerk's consent to a war-
rantless search of a guest's room. The Court reasoned that 
the guest's right to be free of unwarranted intrusion "was a 
right. which only [he] could waive by word or deed, either 
directly or through an agent " Id , at 489 Accordingly, 
the Court rejected resort to "unrealistic doctrines of 'appar-
ent authority'" as a means of upholding the search to which 
the guest had not consented. Id , at 488 * 
'The majority insists that the rationale of Stoner is "ambieuous—and 
perhaps deliberately so" with respect to the permissibility of third-party 
searches where the suspect has not conferred actual authority on the third 
party Ante, at 9 Stoner itself is clear, however; today's majority manu-
factures the ambiguity When the Stoner Court stated that the Fourth 
Amendment is to not to be eroded "by unrealistic doctrines of apparent 
authority,'" 376 U S at 488, and that "only the petitioner could waive by 
word or deed" his freedom from a warrantless search id , at -489, the Court 
rejected precisely the proposition that the majority today adopts 
III 
Acknowledging that the third party in this case lacked au-
thority to consent, the majority seeks to rely on cases sug-
gesting that reasonable but mistaken factual judgments by 
police will not invalidate otherwise reasonable searches 
The majority reads these cases as establishing a "general 
rule" that "what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the 
government—whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the 
police officer executing a warrant, or the police officer con-
ducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement—is not that they always oe correct, out 
that they always be reasonable " Ante, at 8 
The majority's assertion, however, is premised on the erro-
neous assumption that third-party consent searches are gen-
erally reasonable The cases the majority cites thus provide 
no support for its holding In Bnnegar v United States, 338 
U S. 160 (1949), for example, the Court confirmed the unre-
markable proposition that police need only probable cause, 
not absolute certainty, to justify the arrest of a suspect on a 
highway As Bnnegar makes clear, the possibility of factual 
error is built into the probable cause standard, and such a 
standard, by its very definition, will m some cases result in 
the arrest of a suspect who has not actually committed a 
crime. Because probable cause defines the reasonableness 
of searches and seizures outside of the home, a search is rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment whenever that stand-
ard is met, notwithstanding the possibility of "mistakes" on 
the part of police Id , at 176 In contrast, our cases have 
already struck the oalance against warrantless home intru-
sions in the absence of an exigency See supra, at 
Because reasonable factual errors oy law enforcement offi-
cers wall not validate unreasonable searches, the reasonaole-
ness of the officer s mistaken belief that the third part} had 
authority to consent is irrelevant: 
The majority regards Stoner's rejection of "unrealistic doctrines of ap-
parent authority"' as amoiguous on the theory that tne Court mignt ha\e 
been reiernng only to unreasonable applications oi such doctrines, ana not 
to the doctrines themselves Ante, at 9-10 But Stoners express de-
scription of apparent authority doctrines as unrealistic cannot be viewed as 
mere happenstance The Court in fact used the word 'applications' JI the 
same sentence to refer to misapplications of the actual authontv doctrine 
"Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment are not to be eroded oy strained applications oi the law of agencv or 
by unrealistic doctrines of apparent authority '" 376 U S , at 4SS iem-
phasis added) The full sentence thus unambiguously confirms that Stoner 
rejected anv reliance on apparent authority doctrines 
Nor did the Stoner Court leave open the door for a police officer to rely 
on a reasonable but mistaken oeiief in a third party's authority to consent 
when it remarked that "there is nothing in the record to indicate that -he 
police had any Dasis wnatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been 
authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner s 
room " Id , at 489 Stating that a defendant must "by word or deed" 
waive his rights ibid is not inconsistent with noting that in a particular 
case, the aosence of actual waiver is confirmed by the police s inabUit} to 
identify any oasis for their contention that waiver had indeed occurred 
'The same analysis applies to Hill v California 401 U S T97 U971) 
where the Court upheld a search incident to an arrest in which officers rea-
sonaoly but mistakenly oelieved that the person arrested in the defend-
ant's home was the defendant The Court refused to disturb the state 
court's holding that " '[wjhen the police have prooaole cause to arrest one 
party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, 
then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest '" Id , at 802 (brack-
ets in original) (quoting People v Hill, 69 Cal 2d 550, 553, 446 P 2d 521 
523 (1968)) Given that the Court decided Hill before the extension of the 
warrant requirement to arrests in the home, Payton v Neu York, 445 
U S 573 (1980), Hill »nould be understood no less than Bnnegar as simply 
a gloss on the meaning of "probaole cause " The holding in Hill rested on 
the fact that the police had prooable cause to believe that Hill had commit-
ted a crime In such circumstances the reasonableness of the arrest for 
which the police had prooable cause was not undermined by the officers' 
factual mistake regarding the identity of the person arrested 
58 L\S 48<>8 The I nited States LA^ \S EEK 6-19-90 
The majority's rebance on Maryland v Go'n-ison, 480 
U S 79 (1987), is also misplaced In Garrison, the police 
oDtamed a valid warrant for the search of the "third floor 
apartment" of a building whose third floor in fact housed two 
apartments Id , at 80 Although the police had probable 
cause to search onlj one of the apartments, they entered both 
apartments because "[t]he objective facts available to the of-
ficers at the time suggested no distinction between [the 
apartment for which they legitimately had the warrant and 
the entire third floor] " Id , at 88 The Court held that the 
officers reasonable mistake of fact did not render the search 
unconstitutional Id , at 88-89 As in Bnnegar, the 
Court s decision was premised on the general reasonableness 
of the type of police action involved Because searches 
Dased on warrants are generalh reasonable, the officers' rea-
sonable mistake of fact did not render their search "unreason-
aole ' Tnis reasoning is evident m the Court's conclusion 
that little would be gained by adoptmg additional burdens 
* over and aoove the bedrock requirement that, with the ex-
ceptions we have traced in our cases, the police may conduct 
searches onh pursuant to a reasonably detailed warrant " 
Garrison, supra, at 89, n 14 
Garrison, like Bnnegar, thus tells us nothing about the 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of a warrant-
less arrest m the home based on an officer's reasonable but 
mistaken oelief that the third party consenting to the arrest 
^ as empott ered to do so The majority's glib assertion that 
"[i]t would be superfluous to multiply" its citations to cases 
like Bnnegar Hill, and Garrison, ante, at 8, is thus correct, 
out for a reason entirely different than the majority sug-
gests Those cases provide no illumination of the issue 
raised in tnis case, and further citation to like cases would be 
as superfluous as the discussion on uhich the majority's con-
clusion presentlj depends 
IV 
Our case* demonstrate that third-party consent searches 
are free from constitutional challenge only to the extent that 
the} rest on consent by a party empowered to do so The 
majority's conclusion to the contran ignores the legitimate 
expectations of privacy on which individuals are entitled to 
rel> That a person who allows another joint access over his 
property thereby limits his expectation of privacy does not 
justify trampling the rights of a person who has not similarly 
relinquished any of his privacy expectation 
Instead of judging the. validity of consent searches, as we 
have m the past, based on whether a defendant has m fact 
limited his expectation of privacy, the Court today carves out 
an additional exception to the warrant requirement for third-
part} consent searches without pausing to consider whether 
" 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law en-
forcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objec-
tively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment," Mincey, 
437 U S , at 394 (citations omitted) Where this free-float-
ng creation of "reasonable" exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement will end, now that the Court has departed from 
he balancing approach that has long been part of our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, is unclear But by allowing a 
>erson to be subjected to a warrantless search m his home 
nth out his consent and without exigency, the majority has 
aken away some of the liberty that the Fourth Amendment 
Tas designed to protect 
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KANSAS AND MISSOURI, ETC , PETITONERS v 
UTILICORP UNITED, INC 
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The respondent—an investor owned public utihn operating in the peti-
tioner States—and other utilities and natural gas purchasers filed suit in 
the District Court against a pipeline compam and five gas producers 
under § 4 of the Clavton Act which authorizes an\ person injured b\ a 
violation of the antitrust laws to sue for treble damages The utilities 
alleged that the defendants had unlawfully conspired to inflate the price 
of gas that they supplied to the utilities and sought treDle damages for 
both the amount overcharged and the decrease in sales to customers 
caused b\ the overcharge The petitionee States filed separate § 4 ac-
tions in the District Court against the same defendants for the alleged 
antitrust violation asserting inter aim parens patriae claims on behalf 
of all natural persons residing in the States v»ho had purchased gas from 
an\ utility at inflated prices The court consolidated all of the actions 
and granted the utilities partial summary judgmen* with respect to the 
defendants defense that since the utilities had passed through all of the 
alleged overcharge to their customers, the utilities lacked standing be-
cause thev had suffered no antitrust injury as required D\ § 4 In light 
of its conclusion that, under Hanover Shoe Inc \ Lnxted Shoe Machin 
ery Corp 392 U S 481 and Illinois Brick Co \ Illinois 431 U S 
720 the utilities had suffered antitrust injury as direct purcnasers out 
their customers as indirect purchasers, had not the court dismissed the 
States parens patriae claims The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissals 
Held When suppliers violate antitrust laws b\ overcharging a public util-
ity for natural gas and the utilm passes on the overcharge to its cus-
tomers onlv the utility has a cause of action under § 4 because it alone 
has suffered antitrust injury 
1 Three rationales underlie the indirect purchaser rule adopted in 
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick (1) establishing the amount of an over-
charge shifted to indirect purchasers would normally prove insurmount-
able m light of the wide range of considerations influencing a company's 
pricing decisions (2) a pass-on defense would reduce the effectiveness of 
§ 4 actions by diminishing the recovery available to any potential plain-
tiff and (3) allowing suits by indirect purchasers would risk multiple li-
ability because the alleged antitrust violators could not use a pass-on de-
fense in an action by the direct purchasers 
2 The aforesaid rationales compel the conclusion that no exception to 
the indirect purchaser rule should be made for suits involving regulated 
public utilities that^ass on all of their costs to their customers 
(a) Allowing indirect suits m such cases might necessitate complex 
cost apportionment calculations, since a utility bears at least some por-
tion of a passed-on overcharge to the extent that it could have sought 
and gained state permission to raise its rates in the absence of the over-
charge, cf Hanover Shoe supra at 493, and n 9, and since various fac-
tors, such as the need to seek regulatory approval, may delav the pass-
ing on process and thereby require the utility, in the interim to bear 
some of the overcharge s costs m the form of lower earnings Here, the 
certified question leaves unclear whether the respondent could have 
raised its pnces prior to the overcharge, whether it had passed on "most 
or all" of its costs at the time of its suit, and even the means by which the 
pass through occurred Proof of these preliminary issues, which are ir-
relevant to the defendants liability, would turn upon the intricacies of 
state law, and, if it were determined that respondent had borne some of 
the costs would require the adoption of an apportionment formula, the 
very complexity that Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick sought to avoid 
Moreover creating an exception in such cases would make little sense 
